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Many governments use price and tax subsidization to meet social protection objectives  in
lieu  of,  or  in  addition  to,  direct  income  transfers.  Such  subsidies  may be  perceived  as
influencing  behavior  to  further other  socially  desirable  policies.  For  example, the price
response  induced  by lowering the price  of schooling  or key food items  will  both lower
the  cost of living for the beneficiaries  and  also increase  the  investment in education  or
health more than a similar income transfer would achieve.  Governments  may also choose
price subsidies because they are easier to administer than income transfers.  In many cases
they may also be politically more tractable.
The most  common form  of price subsidy  is a direct,  untargeted subsidy.  However,
various other means  may be used to  deliver price subsidies  as  well.  Untargeted  indirect
price  subsidies,  exemptions  on  value  added  or  other  sales  taxes,  dual  exchange  rates,
export taxes, producer quotas, subsidies on transport and storage,  and domestic sales of a
commodity  below  international  opportunity  cost  are  all  forms  of subsidization.  While
such subsidies  do lead  to increased  consumption  towards  a commodity in keeping  with
policy  objectives,  they  usually  also  distort  production  incentives.  Subsidies  on  goods
available in a rationed amount are a less costly alternative  to open ended subsidies on the
entire supply of a good.
The  incidences  of  benefits  from  a  general  price  subsidy  are  proportional  to
purchases  and  can be  deduced  from  a  survey  of expenditures.  For many  commodities,
including most grains commonly consumed,  wealthier households receive  larger transfers
in absolute terms,  yet  the amount of transfer a poor household receives  will  be a larger
share  of  its  budget.  Some  goods,  such  as  meat,  are  inappropriate  vehicles  for
redistribution  since  subsides  on them  will not only  accrue mainly  to the rich  they will
actually  increase  inequality  in  welfare.  On  the  other  hand,  some  governments  have
chosen  to  subsidize  goods  for  which  consumption  declines  as incomes  increase.  These
are termed self-targeted  commodities.
There is substantial  evidence that food subsides do affect nutrient consumption in a
manner different than income transfers.  The reduced price will have a direct influence on
purchases of commodities with general  subsidies  and for rations that exceed the amount
normally purchased. But even in the case of quotas and food stamps there is evidence that
the presence of food related transfers encourages  increased consumption,  possibly due to
changes in the share of resources controlled by women.
Successfully  implementing  subsidy  programs  presents  many  administrative
challenges.  Among the most critical is limiting the sale of subsidized commodities in the
higher  priced  general  market.  Substantial  leakages  have  been  documented  recently  in
several  countries.  Technology  such as  optically  scanned  smart  cards  can provide  cost-
effective monitoring  mechanisms,  and is equally suitable for use with rations and in two-tier price  systems, but may be less appropriate for poor communities without sources of
power for scanning devices.
Reforms  that separate  the government's role as  financier from  the market's role of
providing services have the potential to be the most effective. If, in addition, governments
recognize  that food  policy objectives  are  often achieved  more  effectively  by  delivering
income  support without  any  direct  or indirect ties to food  commodities, reforms  can be
separated  from the consumption of a given commodity or use of a given market channel.
This  increased  flexibility  often  allows  for  better  targeting  as  well  as  an  increased
likelihood  that the  transfers  will  result  in the  poorest  beneficiaries  being  lifted  out of
poverty.
The  nature  and  timing  of subsidy  reforms  depend  on many  factors,  including the
interplay  of  diverse  interests  expressed  by  local  groups  and  international  agencies.
Balancing  the  different  interests  is  not  easy,  but  country  experiences  suggest  several
factors  contribute  to  public  acceptance  of  reforms,  including  advanced  publicity,
introducing  credible  safety  nets  policies  to  protect  the  vulnerable,  and  implementing
reforms during periods of favorable  international commodity prices.Table of Contents
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I. Introduction
Why  use  price  and  tax  subsidization  to  meet  social  protection  objectives?  Governments
regularly  endeavor  to reduce  the cost of living for their population-or  for a subset of the
population-by  subsidizing  the price of goods  or services.  They do  so despite  the fact that
achieving these  objectives through income transfers  instead is  generally  believed to involve
fewer  economic  distortions.  I  begin  this  paper  by  discussing  what  might  motivate
governments  to  choose  price  and  tax  subsidies  rather  than  any  other  instruments.  In  the
course of the subsequent  discussion,  I will ask how well the expectations  of these  subsidies
are matched by actual outcomes.
First,  a government  might  choose  to use pricing  as an instrument  of social protection
because they seek to change demand patterns (Subbarao,  et.  al.  1997).  They may want to do
so because of externalities  associated  with the consumption of certain  goods and services;  in
other  words,  the  benefits  to society  from  the  consumption  of the  good  exceed  that to the
consumer.  Thus,  if the  individual  had  to pay  full  costs  of the  good,  there  would  be  less
consumption than is economically  optimal.  This is a well-known theoretical justification  for
market interventions  and is commonly discussed, for example,  in environmental  economics.
Seldom, however,  is this assumed divergence of social benefits and private returns made
explicit.  Often  there  is  an  unstated  and  patronizing  view  that,  even  accounting  for  their
income,  the  poor invest  too little in health  and nutrition  or education because  they  are less
aware  of the  benefits of such investments  than are  the  policymakers.  Yet,  even if they  are
equally  aware  of these  benefits,  poor households  may  still place  different  values  on these
benefits  than  policymakers  would.  For  example,  parents  may  place  a  higher  value  on
educating  their  sons  than  their  daughters  or  on  making  intergenerational  transfers  to
particular  offspring.  Similarly,  if the mother  of the household  has a different assessment  of
the optimal investment in child health or schooling than her partner, a price  subsidy may shift
the household's budget towards her preferences.2
' The author would like to thank Margaret  Grosh, Kathy Lindert,  and Steven  Tabor for helpful comments  on an
earlier draft.
2 Such a shift may come via the price  effects per se as well as the implicit targeting of the  income transfer that
the subsidies  imply  or both.  For the  underlying  theory of intra-household  allocation,  see Haddad,  Hoddinott,
and Alderman  (1997).  Additional  evidence  is presented  in Thomas,  1994,  as well as in Lundberg,  Pollack, and
Wales (1997).  In addition,  the evidence  that food  stamps are  not equivalent to cash (Fraker,  Martini,  and Ohls,
1995 and Senauer and Young,  1986) may be interpreted to be consistent with the hypothesis that preferences are
gender-specific although  the authors do not make this argument.There are several  reasons why a government may choose to use pricing policy rather than
making income transfers  to help the poor.  First,  lowering the price of,  say,  schooling  or key
food  items  decreases  the  cost  of  living  for  beneficiary  households  and  increases  their
investment  in education or health by a greater magnitude than a similar income transfer would
have achieved.  This increase  in investment may be substantial, particularly  in the case of low-
income  consumers  since the poor  are often  more responsive  to changes  in the price of basic
commodities  than  the  non-poor  (Timmer,  1981).  How  much  additional  consumption  or
investment this provokes will depend  in part on whether the quantity of the subsidized good or
service that a household is permitted to purchase  is greater than they would have consumed  if
they had received only an income transfer. As discussed further below, rations or other quantity
limits may reduce the  overall costs of a subsidy program  but at the same time may negate the
price effect.
A second justification  for the use of subsidies in lieu of income transfers  is that society
as a whole may value a minimum level of consumption  of these  goods. In other words,  the
general  population  may have  a different  view of inequity  in the  consumption of say,  food,
than of overall inequity (Tobin,  1970). Such goods are sometimes termed merit goods and are
given  extra  weight  in  economic  calculations.  Clearly,  this  is  related  to  the  externality
argument  since it implies that, at one level, individuals  derive satisfaction from the fact that
other individuals  are  consuming  certain  goods. Again,  this is rarely made  explicit in policy
discussions, but it underlies the choice of many subsidies by governments.
A third rationale for food and other subsidies is that it is politically easier to use public
funds  on  such  commodities  than  it  is  to  persuade  taxpayers  to  support  direct  income
transfers.  This ties  in to the  second  argument  for subsidies.  It may,  however,  be easier  to
gauge the  political  acceptability  of a proposed  subsidy or transfer  program than to make  a
direct  assessment  of the  underlying  social  value  of the  consumption  of a  commodity.  In
addition,  a price support may be more politically sustainable than an income transfer program
as  a significant  share  of the  benefits  of the  subsidy  will  accrue  to the  middle  class,  thus
broadening  public  support  (Gelbach  and  Pritchett,  1997).  As  illustrated  further  below,
governments  often  take  the  public's  perception  of whether  a  program  is fair  into  account
when designing programs and include public information campaigns in program reforms.
Fourth, in some contexts,  it may be administratively easier to subsidize a commodity than
to deliver  an  income  transfer.  Generally  with  a commodity  subsidy the  government  has  to
monitor the volume of trade handled by a limited number of agents,  say at the border or after
commodities leave the processing phase of the marketing chain. This can be simpler to manage
than it would be to ensure that each recipient household  receives a transfer on a regular basis.
Price  subsidies may also allow the poor to be targeted  without the need to set up an  explicit
targeting bureaucracy.  By choosing to subsidize commodities consumed primarily by the poor,
governments can sidestep the need to identify which households  are poor. That is, by targeting
the revealed behavior of the poor, governments  can avoid the economic as well as the political
costs of screening individuals  on the basis of their incomes,  which they generally do not reveal
(Alderman and Lindert,  1998).
For countries that have value-added taxes (VAT)  or similar sales taxes, a tax exemption for
certain  commodities  affects the income and consumption of consumers  in a manner similar to a
price  subsidy.  While  tax  exemptions  and varying  tax  rates  pose  both practical  and  analytical
problems compared to a uniform rate, the administrative costs of an exemption within an existing
2system  are  likely  to  be  relatively  small  compared  to  the  costs  of delivering  cash  transfers  at
frequent  intervals to  selected  groups.3 In addition to this administrative  advantage,  using VAT
exemptions  as a  means  of lowering  the  cost of living  can  have  the  same targeting  and  merit
goods advantages  as subsidizing the price of unrestricted (general) commodities.
A final reason that some  governments  chose to concentrate on price subsidies-and  on
in-kind transfers-is that they view commodity markets  as inadequate.  At times and in some
places,  this  may  be  a  fair  assessment.  For example,  when  drought  struck  Ethiopia  in the
1980s,  because  of  poor  infrastructure,  challenging  topography,  and  a  history  of  state
interventions  that  had  severely  restricted  trade,  commodity  markets  were  insufficiently
developed  for  the  famine  relief strategy  to be  based  primarily  on  income  support  without
concurrently providing  grain (von Braun, Teklu, and Webb,  1999).  In less extreme situations,
relying  on  state  delivery  mechanisms  is unrealistic  and  fails  to  recognize  the  speed  with
which  markets  respond  to new economic  environments  and develop.  Thus,  India has relied
on the Food Corporation of India, a parastatal,  and a network of public distribution shops to
provide  grain, sugar, oil, kerosene, and other commodities since independence.4 Worse, such
non-market  systems may prevail  because they  give administrators  the opportunity  to extract
rents.  Often  such  subsidies  are  not  directly  administered  to the  consumer  but occur much
earlier  in a marketing  chain.  For example,  Korea  subsidized the  costs of price stabilization
(Tolley,  Thomas, and Wong,  1982), and Pakistan has subsidized the transport  and storage of
grain.  In  other  cases,  governments  have  subsidized  inputs  into  livestock  or  dairy  farming
with the intention of lowering the retail price.
However,  it is  regularly noted that when the  state  attempts to  create  a parallel  market
infrastructure  it crowds  out private  trade or preempts  its development,  often resulting in an
inefficient  distribution  network.  More  generally,  in  many  cases,  attempts  to  reap  the
administrative  advantages  of a commodity  subsidy impose  additional  economic  costs.  For
example,  subsidies not only increase consumption  of the  subsidized commodity  as intended
by  the  policy,  but  they  also  usually  distort  production  incentives  in  unintended  ways
(Pinstrup-Andersen,  1988).  In general, the costs of such distortions are now well known and
will not  be  stressed  in  this  paper.  However,  they  should  be  kept  in mind when  designing
transfer programs.
This paper  will consider  a range  of consumer-oriented  subsidy  instruments  including
general  subsidies  and  tax  exemptions  as  well  as  targeted  quotas  (see  box  1).  Section  II
discusses  the  distribution  or  incidence  of  the  subsidy  expenditures  for  all  of  these
instruments.  It focuses  primarily  on  food  as the  means  by which  the  subsidy  is  delivered,
although  the  section  concludes  with  a  brief  comparison  of food  subsidies  with  energy
subsidies.  The following  section asks whether food subsidies actually achieve the nutritional
and  stabilization  goals  that they  are  often  claimed  to achieve.  Some of the  administrative
concerns  about  market  interventions  that  policymakers  must  consider  are  discussed  in
Section  IV.  These  administrative  concerns  as well  as their effects  on beneficiaries  point to
possibilities for program reform, which are discussed in the final section.
3  Ahmad  and Stern (1991), Newbery and  Stern (1987), Agha and Haughton,  (1996),  and Deaton (1997)  present
detailed discussions of  the theoretical, administrative,  and empirical  dimensions of taxation.
4 However,  recent reforms of the Targeted  Public Distribution  System (TPDS) have shifted  its objectives  away
from being a market of last resort and towards  income support (World Bank, 2000a).
3Box 1: Types of Price and Tax Subsidies
. Unlimited direct price subsidies
*  Tax and VAT exemptions
*  Unlimited indirect price subsidies
. Dual exchange  rates
Export taxes
Producer quotas
Subsidies on transport and storage
Domestic sales below intemational  opportunity cost
. Rationed subsidies (quotas)
Untargeted parallel market channels  for the general population
Targeted access to subsidized goods
Coupons, vouchers, and stamps
II. Distribution of Price Subsidies and Tax Exemptions
What  share  of total  expenditures  on  a price  subsidy  accrues  to the poor?  How  many poor
households  benefit  from  these  subsidies?  While  a  full  assessment  of a  subsidy  program
requires  an  appraisal  of the  economic  consequences  of the  subsidy,  the  most  common
assessment of a price subsidy is in terms of its incidence.  Who gets the subsidy or who does
not depends on a number of policy decisions regarding which commodities are chosen, what
type of targeting,  if any,  is used,  and what  marketing  channels  are employed.  This  section
reviews how these decisions affect the distribution of the benefits of subsidy programs.
Generalized Consumer Subsidies
Whenever  a commodity  or service  is  subsidized  in  a manner that  does not  impose  quotas,
there  is  an  implicit,  or  de facto,  targeting  of the  benefits.  These  benefits  accrue  to  a
household  in proportion to the amount of that good that the household purchases.  For those
commodities  that  are  what  economists  term  normal  goods  (defined  as  goods  with income
elasticities  between  zero  and  one),5 the  wealthier  the  household,  the  greater  the  absolute
value of the subsidy it receives.  However, with commodities in this category, the poorer the
household,  the  larger  the  subsidy  is  as  a  share of household  income.  Most  commonly
consumed grains  tend to fall  in this group. However,  occasionally  a governnent  chooses  to
subsidize  goods for  which the  income  elasticity  is  greater  than  one.  This  is the  cutoff by
which luxuries are commonly defined. Despite the term "luxury,"  many commodities that are
considered part of a normal  diet such as meat and dairy products  often fall in this category.
The  economic  definition  of a luxury,  however,  implies  that the amount  spent  on the good
increases  as a share of total consumption  as income rises.  This also means  that the  amount
transferred  by a subsidy on a good is both absolutely  and relatively  greater for the well off
than for the poor.
In contrast,  there may be goods  that are consumed  in greater amounts by the poor than
by other segments of the populations.  While technically  these commodities  are referred to in
the economic  literature  as  inferior goods,  this designation  pertains to the purchasing pattern
5 Income elasticity measures the percentage  change  in the commodity  purchased with  a one percent change  in
income.
4(or  negative  income  elasticity)  and  not the  physical  attributes of the  commodity.  Thus,  in
some circumstances  coarse grains may be inferior goods in the sense that the absolute  as well
as the relative value of the benefit of a subsidy  is greater for the poor than for the non-poor.
Nevertheless,  from  the  standpoint  of the  nutritional  qualities  of these  grains,  they  are
considered superior to more popular highly polished or refined grains.
Subsidies on commodities with low and, ideally, negative elasticities, if such commodities
are available,  will be progressive.  Subsidies  on such commodities  are often referred  to as self-
targeted.6 This  targeting can  also  be achieved  if there are grades  of the subsidized  good  that
consumers  recognize as  distinct.  For example,  coarse  (high extraction)  flour is more  likely to
be  consumed  by  the  poor  while  consumption  of low  extraction  flour  may be  more  evenly
distributed through a population. However, as purchases of a commodity are disaggregated into
different grades, each good will represent a comparatively  small share of a consumer's budget.
This  small  share poses  a limit  on the  amount  of income  that  can  be transferred  via a  self-
targeted commodity subsidy.
If the  incidence of subsidy benefits were determined  wholly by purchases  in integrated
markets (and,  as discussed below, it often is not), the amount of subsidy going to households
in  different  income  quartiles  would  parallel  consumer  demand  and  could  be  identified  in
advance  using  consumer  expenditure  surveys.  Most  countries  have  consumer  expenditure
surveys that can provide  a reasonable  guide to the distribution  of general  subsidies.  Indeed,
such analysis can often be undertaken prior to a policy change to anticipate its likely impact.
While  the  discussion  so  far  has  indicated  some  well-known  patterns  in  the  relative
magnitude  of demand  elasticities-for  example,  that  grain  consumption  is  more  evenly
distributed  across  a  population  than  is  the  consumption  of meat-there  are  few  general
patterns across all consumer groups.  For example, sugar and cooking oil may be consumed in
virtually  equal  amounts  across  income groups  in a given country or region  or they may  be
regarded as luxury commodities.
Studies  of  subsidies  in  Egypt  have  found  that  the  poor  consume  more  sugar  and
subsidized  bread than  the well off do and  that flour and cooking oil  consumption increase
slightly  with income  (Ali and  Adams,  1996 and Adams,  2000).  An earlier study found that
the value of subsidized  flour and bread consumed by the poorest urban quartile  in 1982 was
15 percent less than that purchased by the rich.  At that time, the poorest rural quartile bought
20  percent  less  from  subsidized  government  channels  than  did  the  richest  rural  quartile,
whose consumption was nearly the same as the urban poor (Alderman and von Braun,  1984).
This implies that the former distribution  was slightly biased towards the well off (although  it
contributed  more  to the poor as  a share  of income).  A  decade  later,  government  subsidies
were somewhat more targeted to the poor. In the interim, the government had implemented  a
policy  that  restricted  subsidies  on  refined  flour  and the  bread  made  from  such  flour  and
concentrated  on bread made from high extraction  flour.
This  contrasts  with  how  the  subsidies  on  flour  in  Algeria  were  distributed  among
income  groups.  In  1991, 8 percent of subsidies  on flour went to the poorest quintile, while  36
percent  went  to  the  richest  (Grosh,  1994).  However,  semolina  (couscous),  for  which  the
6  Self-targeting  can also be used  for services  such as subsidized  clinics  and-via wages-for  determining who
takes up public work opportunities.
Sbenefit ratio of 9:11  was more equitable,  was the principal staple in the economy rather than
flour.  The importance of the context of the subsidy can also be illustrated  by comparing the
distribution  of rice and wheat in urban Belo Horizante,  Brazil with the same commodities in
Sri Lanka prior to the introduction of a targeted program in Sri Lanka in 1978.  In Brazil, the
poor and the rich consumed  similar amounts of the commodities  and, thus, the subsidy was
only slightly regressive.  In Sri Lanka,  however, the poor consumed only half as much wheat
as the well off. This is probably  because in Sri Lanka rice is the main staple for the majority
of the population.  Thus,  urban non-poor  households  as well  as the comparatively  few poor
estate workers who ate bread were the primary beneficiaries of the untargeted  wheat subsidy.
Self-Targeting of General  Subsidies
As previously  mentioned,  when the consumption  of a  good decreases  as  income  rises,  the
subsidy on that good  accrues mainly to the poor.  Some countries  have devoted  a large share
of  their  subsidy  budget  to  such  goods,  which  can  be  considered  as  self-targeted.  Such
targeting  is  particularly  desirable  in that  it  is  based  on  consumer  behavior  and  does  not
require  a  government  agency  to  collect  information  on  consumers'  income  or  other
characteristics  as in most administratively targeted  programs.
One of the most successful attempts to shift general subsidies to self-targeted  goods was
undertaken  by Tunisia between  1985  and  1993.  During that period, the Tunisian  government
shifted from a subsidy program that cost 4 percent of GNP to one that cost half as much. At the
same time, the share of total transfers received by the poorest quintile increased from 8 percent
to 21  percent (Alderman and Lindert,  1998). The core of this change was a shift to subsidizing
self-targeted  commodities,  for example,  reconstituted  milk  in  small  cartons  rather than fresh
milk in bottles. Also, subsidies were applied to purchases of generic  cooking oil in bulk from
drums;  bottled oil  was still available but at market prices.  Similarly,  while subsidies on loaves
of bread  were  retained,  those  on  baguettes  were  eliminated.  Finally,  bread  markets  were
liberalized  to  ensure that the types  of bread  preferred  by the non-poor were  available  on the
open market.
While  the  Tunisia  example  indicates  the  potential  for  targeting  consumer  subsidies
through  a judicious choice of commodities, it also indicates  some  of the limitations of self-
targeted programs.  First, although  some individual  commodities  were well targeted,  the full
package of subsidies and exemptions  was less so.  Had the set of commodities  subsidized  in
Tunisia  included  only four  commodities  of which the  poor  consumed  more  than  the  non-
poor, the share to the poorest quintile would have risen to 25 percent.  Second, even the most
favorable  self-targeted  commodities  will  only distribute  between  one-half to  two-thirds  of
benefits to the poorest 40 percent of the population (Alderman  and Lindert,  1998), while the
most successful  means-tested  transfer programs have  the potential to deliver over 80 percent
of benefits to the poorest two quintiles  (Grosh,  1994). Third, since self-targeted  commodities
generally constitute  only a small share of the overall budget  even of the poor, they can only
bring  about modest  income  transfers.  In other words,  since  household  purchases  are small
under any price regime, there is a limit to the total size of the transfer that can be made using
these goods.
Indirect  Subsidies
Often  commodity  price  subsidies  are  not  financed  by  an  explicit  line  item  in the  central
budget but via  indirect taxes  on producers,  including  procurement  and  trade  quotas,  or by
6exchange  rate distortions (Kruger,  Schiff,  and Valdes,  1991).  Estimating  the distribution  of
such benefits  and costs  is more  complicated  than  assessing the direct benefits  of a targeted
consumer subsidy.  This distribution  depends,  in part, on whether the poor are net producers
or  consumers.  This  information  can  be  derived  from  survey  data.  This  analysis  may
challenge  the  generalization  that  all  farmers  benefit  from  higher  prices.  For  example,
Trairatvorakul,  (1984) and Deaton (1989) indicate that both the smallest and the largest farms
in Thailand  benefit  from the  export tax, whereas  the tax results in a net loss of income  for
farmers with medium-sized holdings.
However,  the  benefits  and  costs  of price  distortions  also  depend  on  the  net  supply
response  in agriculture  and  on the demand  for  labor.  This step  of the analysis  is somewhat
more  complicated  than  an  investigation  of budget  shares  and  net  sales.  Nevertheless,  the
necessary  information  is  often  available  in any  given  country  or  region  so  that  a partial
equilibrium analysis can  still be used for understanding the role of indirect subsidies. Beyond
this,  many  changes  in taxes  and procurement  quotas  may have  a measurable  influence  on
exchange  rates  and  international  trade.  Under  these  circumstances,  a  fuller  general
equilibrium analysis  may reveal additional insights into the cost of the indirect subsidies.
Tax Exemptions
A tax exemption affects  a consumer  in a manner directly comparable  to a subsidy;  the effect
may  be  either  progressive  or  regressive  depending  on  whether  the  relative  savings  accrue
mainly to the poor or the non-poor.  Thus, the distribution of the savings to consumers from a
value added tax (VAT) exemption follow the same patterns as a price subsidy.
One example that has been recently studied is the exemptions from the  14 percent VAT
on a short list of food commodities in South Africa. The poorest 40 percent of the population
receive  65.4 percent  of the  exemption on the maize VAT, but this group receives  only  15.3
percent  of the  exemption  on  fresh  milk.  The  regressive  incidence  of the  distribution  of
benefits  of the  VAT  exemption  on  milk  in  South  Africa  represents,  in part,  differences
among income groups in market utilization and in access to refrigeration.  On the other hand,
the progressive  distribution  of the  exemption  on maize  illustrates  the effective  use of self-
targeting, as discussed  above.
Both  of these  exemptions  cost  the  South  African  treasury  over  600  Million  Rand.
Similarly,  if a  proposed  exemption  on  the  tax  on meat  is  implemented,  the  value  of the
savings for the poor would be 325 Million Rand (1993 value) compared to the 436.1  M Rand
they  received  with  the  maize  exemption.  However,  the  total  revenue  lost  with  the  meat
exemption would  be  1.8  B  Rand and,  thus,  would dwarf the  costs of the maize  exemption
(Alderman  and del Ninno,  1999).
Market Access  as a Determinant of the Incidence of Subsidies
The  use  of budget  shares  to subsidize  commodities  as  an  indication  of the  distribution  of
benefits  presumes  that  all  segments  of the  population  use  the  same  market  channels.
Otherwise,  the  redistributive  nature  of the  subsidy  will  differ  according  to  whether  the
consumer  purchased  the  good  from  the  channel  that was  subsidized  rather than  a parallel
channel  or  consumed  the  good  out  of home  consumption.  While  rural  residency  is  not
synonymous with participation  in agriculture  or indeed with self-sufficiency in production,  a
substantial  share of the rural  poor do not benefit  from consumer  subsidies  since they either
7produce  their own  food  or obtain  what  they need  by direct trade  with and purchases  from
neighbors.  This is not an insurmountable  barrier to using subsidies  as  a component of rural
social protection;  both  Sri Lanka and Egypt have  managed to include the rural population  in
their subsidy systems. Nevertheless,  it is an obstacle that must be considered.
The poor also may be precluded  from benefiting  from subsidies  by cash constraints.  If
subsidized commodities  are pre-packaged  or only available for a few days a month, the poor
may be unable to make the scale of purchase necessary to take advantage  of the subsidy. This
was the case with a rice subsidy in urban Burkina Faso  (Delgado and  Reardon,  1988)  and is
often  presumed  to  limit  utilization  of the subsidized  Public  Distribution  System  (PDS)  in
India. A recent study has provided evidence that supports the contention that the need of the
poor to make  small purchases  influences  which market channels  they choose.  The study in
question documented  the  small  size  of purchases  made by the poor  in south  India and the
relatively higher prices that they paid due to this cash flow problem (Rao, 2000).
Does Willingness to Wait Target Goods to the Poor?
Qften a government  is unable to supply as much food as would be consumed at the official, or
subsidized,  price.  This  may  be  motivated  either  by  a  (comparatively  rare)  shortage  of the
commodity or due to insufficient funds to provide a subsidy on the full quantity of a good that
is  available  on  the market.  In such  cases,  many  governments  impose  quantity  limits  as  an
alternative to allowing the price to rise in order to both reduce  consumer demand and limit the
subsidy bill. Commonly these restrictions take the form of rations or quotas  (discussed below).
However, another  means of allocating  goods when prices  are not allowed  to rise is simply by
distributing  as much as is available  on a first-come-first-served  basis.  Consumers  respond  to
this type of distribution  by  queuing,  often  before the outlet  is  even open  to the  public.  The
waiting time for goods in short supply discourages their purchase and encourages the purchase
of alternatives  (including,  at times,  the  sarne  commodity  sold  at higher  prices  in  a parallel
market).  In  effect,  then,  the  price  (as  defined by cash  plus  the value  of waiting)  clears  the
market.  However, as the retailers only collect the cash and not the value of the time costs, this
means that market clearing incurs what is termed a "deadweight" loss to society in general.
Such a loss is implicitly regarded as being necessary for achieving equity in distribution.
It  is  assumed  that the poor have  more  time than cash-or,  in economic  parlance,  that the
opportunity cost of their time is lower than that of non-poor consumers.  Thus, it is assumed
that the poor will be more willing  than the non-poor to queue.  While theoretically  plausible,
this is not always  borne out  in practice.  As has been observed in Egypt (Alderman and  von
Braun,  1984) the poor may not benefit from such rationing by waiting  since cash constraints
limit the  size  of the purchase  that  they  can make.  A middle-class  consumer  may  be more
willing  to queue  to  procure  a  10-kilo  sack  of rice  than  a low-income  person will  be  for  a
single  kilo.  In  addition,  once  markets  are  segmented  in  this  manner,  the  location  of
distribution  outlets  is a key factor  in determining  the distribution  of the commodity.  In the
Egyptian  example,  government  employees  had the  advantage  of being  able  to wait in line
during office hours.
Rations and Quotas
A  more  common  means  of  limiting  a  subsidy  when  a  government  does  not  choose  to
subsidize  all  the  sales  of a  commodity  is by  imposing  limits  on  the  amount  that  any  one
household may purchase.  Such rationing has often been used to limit consumption in wartime
8and  to  ensure  that  all  consumers  have  access  to  a  minimum  quantity  of selected  goods.
However,  rations have also been used to reduce the cost of consumer subsidies  when there is
no shortage of aggregate  supplies. In the latter case, purchases above the rationed subsidized
quantities  are  often permitted  in an open market (Pinstrup-Andersen,  1988).  Ration systems
of this type have been a perennial,  albeit fluctuating,  feature in South Asia as well as in West
Asia and North Africa.  Similarly,  until recently the Mexican government  had put a quota on
subsidized and, at times, free tortillas in urban areas.
Clearly, quotas can limit the total cost of the subsidy program. A ration system does not
eliminate  uncertainty  in  budgetary planning  since the  cost of the system  is determined  not
only by known quantities and fixed ration prices but also by the variable cost of obtaining the
commodity. Thus, a sudden rise in the local or international price of the good can result in an
unplanned  increase  in the subsidy budget.  Nevertheless,  this finarncial  risk is less than if the
quantity to be subsidized is open-ended.
Against  the  advantages  of greater  predictability  and  lower  total  volume  in  a  ration
system, however,  is the disadvantage that in most programs the price that determines the total
quantity that a consumer will acquire  is not the ration price but the higher open market price.
If the ration quota is less than the amount that consumers  would have  chosen to purchase at
the ration price (deemed  an infra-marginal  purchase in economic literature),  consumers  will
base  their  decision  on  how much  to buy  on  the price  outside  the ration  shop,  not on  the
average price. As such, the benefit  of a ration program  is the implicit income  transfer.  Thus,
the lower price of the ration does not induce increased  consumption though a price response.
Even in this circumstance,  the  quantities  purchased  will usually increase  since  the subsidy
will  make the  consumer  somewhat  richer,7 but this shift  will  generally  be  less than if the
marginal price were to fall.
If quotas  are  uniform  across  a population,  the  incidence  of benefits  will be  virtually
neutral,  with  some  variation  depending  on  whether  the  quota  is  per  individual  (which
generally favors  low-income households)  or per family.  However, the take-up of the rations
will generally not be universal. Upper-income households  may opt to obtain their food in the
higher priced open market if they perceive the quality of the food sold to be higher or if there
is some  social  stigma attached  to using  the  ration  system.  As mentioned,  some  of the very
poor may also not use their ration  allocation if they do not have the cash to procure  the full
quota. Egypt's ration system is an example where both quotas and take-up have until recently
varied little by income group (Alderman  and von Braun,  1984).8  In contrast, the share of the
population  using Pakistan's fair price shop to purchase  subsidized  flour declined steadily  in
the  decade  prior  to  its removal  in  1987  (Alderman,  1988).  This  decline  accelerated  when
sugar was de-rationed  and was primarily among  upper income groups who viewed the flour
as being of poor quality.
Montgomery  (1985) presents evidence that consumers  in Bangladesh base their decision
about whether  or not to use their quotas  on the fluctuations  of the  price  of rice in the open
market.  As  such,  the highly flawed  and mistargeted  system of rations  that was  in place  in
7 His or her income will have risen by the difference  between the open market clearing price and the ration price
times the quota. The underlying  economic theory  is presented  in Neary and Roberts (1980). See  also Pinstrup-
Andersen (1988).
8 However,  Ali  and  Adams  (1996)  report  that  in Egypt  the  percentage  of the  population  with  ration  books
declined from 90 percent in the  1980s to 80 percent in  1994.
9Bangladesh  at the time of his study did manage  to serve  as a safety net.  In other words, the
rations provided  some assistance  to poor households  during a particularly  stressful  time, yet
the rations were abandoned when conditions improved.
Administrative Targeting
Governments  often set higher quotas on subsidized goods for the poor than for the non-poor.
In  such  cases,  eligibility  for  the  subsidy  is  usually  determined  through  administrative
targeting.  While  in  principle,  an  administratively  targeted  distribution  system  does  not
require  a quota  system-eligible  groups  may be permitted  to obtain all  their demand  for a
commodity  at  a subsidized price-limits  on purchases  are  generally  imposed  to restrict the
resale of these  goods to households deemed ineligible for the subsidy.  The general principles
and examples of such targeting are discussed elsewhere  in this primer. The same factors that
decide the success of targeting in the case  of income transfers  in general  also determine  the
effectiveness  of the targeting of in-kind programs.  Indeed, the improvement  in the targeting
of subsidies  in  Sri  Lanka  that  is  often  attributed  to  its  food  stamp  program  was  actually
achieved  by  reorienting  the  ration  distribution  prior  to the  introduction  of the  food  stamp
program (Edirisinghe,  1987).
However,  a few points  on targeting  should  be  reiterated  from the perspective  of food
distribution  systems.  While  in-kind  transfers  and  rations  are  generally  infra-marginal  and,
thus,  serve  as  income  support,  quotas  are  often  not  determined  on  the  basis  of income.
Historically,  civil servants, in particular,  have been frequent beneficiaries  of subsidized grain
as,  for  example,  in  Bangladesh's  multi-level  ration  system  in  the  first  decade  after  the
country's  independence  (Ahmad,  1988  and  Ahmed,  Haggblade,  and  Chowdhury,  2000).
Similarly,  only  in  the  last  few  years  has  the  Indian  governnent  emphasized  large  price
differentials on a comparatively  small amount of grain for the poor in its Public Distribution
System  (since  renamed  the  Targeted  Public  Distribution  System).  This  contrasts  with
previous attempts  to increase the  share of the total quantity of rationed  goods consumed by
the poor.  This is a potentially significant reorientation since  the program has high unit costs
for handling  grain.  Increasing  the transfer  to the poor per  kilo purchased  will  increase the
efficiency  of the  income  transfer  (World  Bank,  2000a).  India  also  increased  the  poverty
orientation  of state  quotas,  shifting  from an  allocation  formula that favored  states  with the
largest food deficits whether or not they were relatively poor.
Are Energy Subsidies  Substantially  Differentfrom Food  Subsidies?
Many of the justifications  for energy  subsidies  are  similar to those  outlined above  for  food
subsidies.  Indeed,  in many  countries,  energy  subsidies  may utilize  far more resources  than
are currently devoted to food or other commodities.  This is currently the case in the countries
of the  former  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe  (World  Bank,  2000b).  There  is  also  a
tendency to subsidize energy  when a country  is an exporter of gas or oil,  often ignoring the
opportunity  cost  of the  gas  or  oil.  In  other  words,  countries  neglect  the  forgone  export
revenues that the oil would otherwise  bring in when they choose to set the domestic price of
energy. Azerbaijan, for example,  a country that falls into both of these categories, devotes  13
percent of its GNP to energy subsidies  (World Bank, 2000c).  Energy subsidies are frequently
examined independently  from other  subsidies  such as food,  partly because of the  scale  and
partly because the range of instruments for subsidizing energy differs from food subsidies.
10However,  it  is useful  to  highlight  some key similarities  and differences.  As with food
prices, the  incidence of energy  subsidies and  a first-order  approximation of their  impact  on
welfare  can be derived from a consumer survey that indicates expenditures  on the commodity
by income group. Alderman  and del Ninno (1999), for example, used such an analysis to find
out  whether  a  VAT  exemption  for  kerosene  in  South  Africa  would  be  progressive.  In
contrast,  a kerosene  subsidy in Indonesia favored well-off consumers since the commodity is
a necessity  rather than an  inferior  good  in urban  areas  and  is virtually  unavailable  in rural
communities  (Pitt,  1985).  Similarly,  in  most  low-income  countries,  electricity  subsidies
would  be  largely  skewed  to  the  well  off since  poor  households  are  not connected  to  the
national  grid  in many  areas.  This  is  not the case,  however,  in much of the  former  Soviet
Union and  Eastern Europe  (World Bank  2000b),  where  energy  subsidies  can thus be more
equally distributed.
Indeed, where connections to the grid are available,  subsidies on electricity usage can be
rationed with prices increasing as the amount of electricity used increases.  In other countries,
governments  have set different prices for different neighborhoods depending  on their level of
prosperity.  While these subsidy mechanisms  have counterparts in the area of food subsidies,
other  means  of providing  energy  subsidies-for  example,  by  abstaining  from  suspending
service for non-payment  in the case of poor households or by subsidizing connections  but not
usage-have  no such parallel.  Other characteristics  of energy  subsidies, such as the fact that
these subsidies may  go to producers  rather than consumers,  are not unique to that sector yet
are  potentially  more  important  in the design  of an  effective  safety net  than  in the  case  of
other  subsidies.  As  with any  general  subsidy,  there  is  a danger  that  untargeted  production
subsidies  may dominate  public expenditures  on consumer subsidies  for the poor.  Moreover,
the distortions that such subsidies entail give interest groups a reason to oppose such reforms.
III. Externalities
Do price  subsidies  have a  greater  impact on nutrition than income transfers?  As mentioned,
one  rationale for policymakers  to choose price subsidies as opposed to cash transfers  is that
such  subsidies  can  encourage  the  consumption  of goods that  improve  nutrition  or lead to
greater  household  investments  in  health  and  education.  There  is  ample  evidence  that  the
distribution  of such  subsidies  at  clinics  or  schools  can  increase  the  utilization  of those
services  (see,  for  example,  Ravallion  and  Wodon,  2000  on  food  for  education  in
Bangladesh).  These  gains  can,  in principle,  also  be achieved  with cash or coupon  transfers
based on eligibility determined by clinic or school attendance, however the important issue of
the link between behavior and eligibility will not be discussed here (see Bitran and Giedion).
As previously  mentioned, the magnitude of the impact of a subsidy on consumption  is
largely determined  by whether the subsidy  is infra-marginal.  For an infra-marginal  subsidy,
consumption  will increase  in accordance  with the increase  in household  income,  while for a
marginal  subsidy,  the  consumption  increase  will  be based  on  the price  response.  The  net
effect of a price increase on the consumption of a commodity at the margin can be five or ten
times as large as the impact of a similar subsidy on an infra-marginal  transfer.9 However, the
subsidy bill will also be larger in.the case of the marginal transfer.
9 To  illustrate,  suppose that the subsidy  reduces  the price  of a commodity  by 25  percent.  If the amount of a
commodity that is subsidized represents  10 percent of the budget of the poor (this assumption favors a relatively
large income response),  then an  infra-marginal transfer  increases  income by 2.5 percent.  This change  in income
will lead to an  increase of consumption  proportional  to the income  elasticity. If it is assumed that this elasticity
11Still, for many purposes,  policymakers  are concerned  not with the impact on a specific
commodity  but  with  the  impact  on  total  nutrient  consumption.  The  increased  household
income  due  to  the  transfer-whether  infra-marginal  or  otherwise-will  not  only  lead  to
increased  consumption  of the  subsidized  good  but also  of other  commodities.  The  exact
magnitude of such a response  is a subject of debate, in part because  a portion of the increase
in expenditures  on food may represent an increase in the quality as opposed to the quantity of
food  items.  However,  there  is  now  a  semblance  of consensus  on that  topic  (Strauss  and
Thomas,  1995  and  Alderman,  1993),  which  accepts  that the quantity of food consumed  by
households  (as measured  by calorie  intake) tends to increase  with income  growth while not
assuming that all income increments are spent on increased food consumption.
In general,  low-income  households  spend half or even more of their increased  income
on  food,  but  some  of this  spending  is  used  to  buy  higher-quality  foods  and  to  vary  the
household  diet  rather than  simply to  buy  increased  quantities  of food.  The  net result  is an
increase  in  nutrient intake  that is proportionally  less than the increase in food expenditures.
Since a cash or coupon transfer can achieve this effect, the question is whether subsidies lead
to  a greater  increase  in consumption  than a cash transfer would encourage.  As before,  this
depends  on  the  price  effect.  However,  the  answer  also  hinges  on  whether  the  subsidy
increases the income response.
While the mechanism  is still unclear,  there is evidence that the answer to this question
appears  to  yes.  This  is  indicated  in  a  set  of  studies  comparing  food  stamps  to  cash.'0
Similarly,  del  Ninno  and  Dorosh  (2000)  found  that  the  provision  of  flood  relief  in
Bangladesh  in the form  of wheat  led to an increase  in the consumption  of wheat and in the
total number of calories consumed than would a cash transfer of an equivalent value.
As  to the  price  effect,  this,  by  definition,  occurs  only in  marginal  subsidies.  The  net
effect  on  nutrient  consumption  is  often  quite  different  than  the  net  effect  on  a  single
commodity.  This  is because  a change  in the price of a single commodity  leads both to the
increased  use of that good and  a set of increases  and decreases  in the consumption  of other
goods (Pinstrup-Andersen,  de Londono, and Hoover,  1976). Thus, the impact of a subsidy on
wheat may be partially offset by the change in consumption of rice and maize and vice versa
(Calegar and  Schuh,  1988).  Alderman  and del Ninno (1999) showed that in South Africa the
impact on calorie consumption of VAT exemptions  on maize was amplified by the fact that
the consumption  of beans complemented  that of maize.  Conversely,  in rural areas  (but not
urban areas),  a tax exemption on meat would have increased  the number of households with
a  calorie  deficit since  the  increase  of meat consumption  following  a price  decrease  would
also lead to reductions in the consumption of other foods that are cheaper sources of calories.
A number  of studies have  looked  at the impact  of food  supplementation  programns  on
anthropometric  measures of nutritional  status  such as child growth."  Others have looked at
the  impact  of prices  on  nutrition.  Yet  there  are  few  direct  assessments  of the  impact  of
subsidy  programs  on nutrition.  Garcia  and  Pinstrup-Andersen  (1987),  however,  assessed  a
is 0.5,  consumption of the good  will increase by 1.25  percent. If the price elasticity were to be a comparatively
modest  -0.3,  the  response  for  a  similar  proportional  price  reduction  at  the  margin  will  be  to  increase
consumption  by 7.5 percent.
'° See footnote  2.
"Supplementary  feeding and similar programs  such as the Women's Infant and Children Program  (WIC) in the
US are addressed in Rogers and Coates (forthcoming).
12subsidy scheme  in the Philippines using randomized design  and verified  that price subsidies
can  have  a measurable  impact  on  nutrition.  They  also  found  that  this  impact  is  larger  if
nutritional  education  is  also  provided  along  with  the  subsidy.  The  unique  feature  of this
program  was  not  the  items  that  were  subsidized  (rice  and  cooking  oil)  or  the  means  of
delivery (rations distributed  at local retail outlets) but the fact that the pilot included a control
group in order to distinguish the impact of the program from other local trends.
Moreover,  studies of how changes  in unsubsidized  food prices affect nutrition  confirm
that  substitution  between  commodities  does  not negate  the  effect  of price  movements  on
nutrition  (Lavy  et  al,  1996).  Therefore,  it  is  likely  that  a  subsidy  on  a staple  commonly
consumed by the poor will have a direct impact on their nutritional status.
How Much Do Subsidies Contribute  to Stabilization?
In addition to lowering the cost of food, price subsidies generally reduce price fluctuations as
well.  Indeed,  many governments  have  stabilization  as their stated  objective  for introducing
subsidies  and  ration  programs,  though  few  in  fact  concentrate  only  on  price  variability
without also attempting to lower the mean price. In many economic  calculations,  the value is
low of reducing the variance of prices while preserving the same average price. However,  the
value of stability may reflect imperfections or frictions in the market. For example, producers
acquire  and utilize new information at a cost.  Similarly consumers'  habits may make it easier
for them  to adjust to  a price  decrease  than to  a price  rise.  Moreover,  as price  fluctuations
increase  the risk  of making  investments,  they  may  lead to less  than  optimal  investment  in
production and storage.  Finally,  as Timmer  (1991  and  1996)  has argued,  the preference  for
such stability is revealed in the political marketplace.
In many circumstances a general subsidy can moderate fluctuations  in the cost of living.
However,  in principal, a subsidy that reduces the cost of a good,  can increase the variability
in  its  price.  For example,  if a commodity  is  currently  subsidized  at  half the  international
price,  a 25 percent increase in the world price would lead to a 50 percent increase in the local
price if the fluctuation was passed through-that  is, if the per unit subsidy remained constant.
In contrast,  a fixed price, whether  generalized or rationed,  would stabilize the nominal cost to
consumers,  but would  pass  on the  instability to the budget.  Thus,  the potential  gains from
stabilizing  wholesale  and retail  price may be offset by instability transmitted to the macro-
economy (Scobie,  1988).
A  similar  situation  arises  with price  stabilization  programs  that use  market purchases
and  releases  to  keep  prices  within  a  given  range.  It  is  difficult  to  provide  the  operating
ministries  with an annual budget for these activities  since, if run effectively,  their costs will
be unpredictable.  In order to justify keeping prices within this range,  ministries must make
storage agents  commit to buying whatever  quantity of the good would be necessary to keep
prices above the trigger point.  Similarly, storage agents must commit to selling as much as is
demanded  at the  ceiling price that they need to  defend. Unlike  private traders,  they are not
able to offset  losses  that they incur when prices  do not rise  sufficiently  high to cover their
storage costs  with profits  earned  in other  years.  Often when  governments can  not defend  a
price floor, they often put in a defacto or dejure quota system with the inevitable  result that
a two-tier  market emerges  to  the disadvantage  of smaller  producers.  Similarly,  there  have
been situations  when budgets  have been insufficient to produce  as much grain as needed  for
price  stabilization.  In these  cases,  not  all traders  (or food  processors)  were  given access  to
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consumers.  For example,  in  Zimbabwe,  maize  in  government  storage is  more  likely to be
processed in roller mills than in the cheaper hammer mills. Thus, the cheaper source of maize
becomes  scarce both as the post-harvest  season  lengthens and when the amount of domestic
production decreases.  Thus, the weighted average cost of meal (from both roller and hammer
mills) is more volatile than the cost of the grain itself.
This is  not  to  say  that  all  stabilization  attempts  assist only those  fortunate  enough  to
benefit  from  quotas.  Pakistan,  for example,  has maintained  a program  that handles  a large
share of the marketed surplus and of wholesale demand  for wheat.  The government's  storage
policies-as  well  as relatively  low  variability  in  production  due  to  an extensive  irrigation
network-have  contributed  to  comparatively  low  price  variability  (Pinckney,  1989).
Accepting the desire for inter- as well as intra-annual price stability,  Pinckney then indicates
the fiscal costs of policies that aim to achieve a desired level of stability.
Indonesia has also been among the few countries that have been successful in stabilizing
prices through its procurement  and sales through its logistics agency BULOG  (Timmer,  1991
and  1996).  Unlike Pakistan,  however,  BULOG has traditionally  avoided getting involved in
direct distribution  to households.  Instead, it has used the open market.  Periodically  it injects
supplies  of  rice  into  urban  markets  to  put  downward  pressure  on  prices.  Indonesia's
experience  also  differs  from  other  countries  in  that  it  has  at  various  times  imported  a
sufficiently  large share  of the rice  traded  on the  world  market  so that  its policies  actually
affect  international  prices.  Dawe  (1998)  used  the  Indonesian  government's  market
interventions  following the drastic devaluation  of the rupiah  in 1997 as an illustration of the
potential  for  price  stabilization.  Timmer  (1996)  argued  that  this  kind  of  stabilization
enhances  equity  since  it  provides  an  environrnent  that  encourages  investment  and  this
contributes  to  the  macro-economy.  However,  the  interplay  of consumer  price  stabilization
and macro-economic  growth  is  a controversial  issue  with little  empirical  evidence,  in part
because  few countries  have  been successful  at stabilizing  prices.  Indeed,  to summarize,  the
benefits of stabilization  are far harder to quantify than are the costs. Nevertheless, there may
be substantial  macroeconomic  benefits  to finding  more  efficient  ways  to achieve  a certain
degree of price stabilization.
Having said this, even Indonesia had to abandon its use of open market sales to stabilize
prices  in the  wake  of the  1997  devaluation.  Subsidizing  rice  at  well  below  import  prices
proved fiscally unsustainable  and  encouraged  smuggling  and re-export.  However,  Indonesia
subsequently  managed  to  implement  a  fairly  well  targeted  safety  net  consisting  of the
provision  of a quota of subsidized rice to poor households  on the basis of a simple formula.
Thus, changes in its exchange rate that turned a policy geared to producer subsidies into one
that required consumer subsidies prompted Indonesia to institute targeting to achieve its food
pricing objectives.
IV. Administrative Concerns
What  facets  of commodity  subsidies  entail  costs  distinct  from  those  associated  with  the
administration of targeting per se? One particular  consideration  is how to limit the  sale  of
subsidized commodities in the higher priced general market. This is not primarily an issue of
consumers  reselling  their  ration  but  rather  dealers  diverting  goods  from  one  channel  to
another.  "Back-door"  sales  may  occur  upstream  in  the  marketing  channel,  that  is,  at  the
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sold at open market prices for which a merchant claims and receives a subsidy,  this does not
fit in with policymakers'  aims for their subsidy program. However, it is far less clear that this
is the  case  when a household  resells  part of its  quota.  Given  some  of the justifications  for
subsidies  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  policymakers  may  see  the  resale  of rations  by
households  as  a departure  from the objectives of the program. However,  such  resale would
enhance the welfare of the household since it would permit them to purchase goods that they
may prefer  to  the  subsidized  good.  In  any  case,  there  is  little  evidence  that  such  sales  by
households  occur in ration distribution  schemes,  which are  often infra-marginal.  However,  it
is widely  assumed that participants  in food-for-work  programs  frequently  sell their  in-kind
wages  (food).  One study  that attempted to  document  the resale  of rations  in Egypt failed to
find  any  evidence  of this  phenomenon.  Moreover,  this  study  did not  find  any evidence  of
upstream leakage; aggregated  survey data of purchases reported by households matched quite
closely  with  the Ministry  of Supply  figures  of total  sales  in the  shops  that were  surveyed
(Alderman and von Braun,  1984).  2
However, this match may be an exception.  The gap between grain released to mills and
reported  purchases  of flour  in  a  household  survey  in  Pakistan  was  69  percent of the  total
amount  (Alderman,  1988).  Similar  gaps  between  official  releases  and  household
consumption  have been reported for India's  TPDS (Ahluwalia,  1993  and Moojj,  1999).  It is
difficult  to trace  how much of this leakage  occurs  at the warehouse  and how much  at the
retail shop.  Rao (2000) found evidence to support the common allegation  that some retailers
simply  sell  the  subsidized  grain  at  the  open  market  price,  thus  increasing  their  margin.
Similarly, in Mozambique,  Dorosh, del Ninno, and Sahn (1996) found appreciable  leakage of
subsidized yellow maize into the open market.
Because  this  is not  easy to monitor,  it  is also  difficult  to prevent.  Mexico,  however,
found  a  technological  solution  to  this  problem.  Under  reforms  introduced  in  1991,
consumers  screened  for a means-tested  program  were  provided  with smart  cards entitling
them  to  a  daily  quota  of free  bread  (tortillas).  These  cards  were  optically  scanned  by
machines that were  distributed to the outlets that supplied the tortillas.  The procedure  did
not update information  on the card itself and did not scrutinize consumers,  but it provided
the  monitoring  agency  with  an  exact  reading  of the  number  of customers  receiving  free
tortillas at each outlet. Thus, the baker's reimbursement  was easy to track.  The cost of the
equipment was reported  to be a small share of the program's  costs.  This proportion would
depend,  in part, on the density of the population  served  (hence the  number of participants
using any tortilleria).  In addition, the modest share of costs for monitoring may reflect the
relatively high value of the subsidy per participant.
Mexico  took this  reliance  on smart  cards  further  in  1995  when  it piloted  a  successor
program  in the  urban area of the state of Campeche.  Eligible  households  received  a plastic
card that could  be electronically  scanned and that was revalidated  on a monthly basis when
women-the  program  stipulated  that  only  women  would  receive  the  card-visited  health
clinics  with their  children.  The  card,  which was to  be  used to  pay  for food  purchases  at
12  Anecdotes  about  unrationed  but highly  subsidized  bread  being resold to be used as animal  feed have  been
common.  However, Alderman and von  Braun (1984)  found that, if this ever  happened,  it probably consisted  of
bakers selling day-old  bread at reduced  prices. Households  reported  using 5  to 6 percent of their bread to feed
their own animals.
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This  program  was  essentially  a  food  stamp  program  and  thus  differed  from  the  type  of
programs reviewed  in this paper.  However,  the technology used  is equally  suitable  for use
with rations  and  in two-tier  price  systems.  Although  the technology  was  manufactured  in
South  Africa,  it is not necessarily  suitable  for use in poor communities  since  the scanning
devices require a source of electric power.
Many  subsidy  programs  require  a  distribution  network.  Indeed,  some  systems  may
require two distribution networks,  one for any coupons  or ration certification and one for the
commodities themselves.  Moreover,  in many cases,  these costs  are  appreciably  higher than
the costs of private marketing.  In India, for example, even leaving aside any costs associated
with mistargeting, the cost of getting grain to the recipients was nearly 50 percent higher than
the value to the consumer (Radhakrishna and Subbarao,  1997 and World Bank, 2000a).  This
may  be  due  to  various  inefficiencies  inherent  in  bureaucracies  that  have  no  competitive
incentives  to  minimize  costs,  including  centralized  and  layered  management  as  well  as
inflexible procurement rules.  For example, public marketing systems often use pan-territorial
prices.  While  these  pricing  schemes  may  serve  other  policy  objectives,  they  produce
economic  distortions.  Also,  linking  procurement  for  consumer  subsidies  with  agricultural
support programs may lead to excessive transportation costs.  For example, India procures the
bulk of the grain for its public distribution system in the northwest of the country rather than
closer to the places where it is distributed to beneficiaries.
Governments  often  argue that there  is a need  for the  state to transport  and  store grain
because the private market is not sufficiently  developed to handle the volume of trade that is
needed  for  a national  subsidy programs.  There  is  a  large  literature  on  how  such  central
interventions  create the very conditions  that they were attempting to change. That is, even  in
the  absence  of prohibitions  on  private  storage-a  common  response  by  governments  to
production  shortfalls-direct  and indirect  subsidies  to  state  corporations  crowd  out private
investments.  Also,  in  some  cases,  state  market  channels  will  prompt  inefficient  private
investments  in response  to the distorted price  environment.  For example,  by subsidizing the
transportation  of  wheat  but  not  flour,  the  Pakistan  govermnent  has  encouraged  the
construction  of small  flour  mills  throughout  the  country  that  fail  to  take  advantage  of
economies of scale (Alderman,  1988).
While  few  large-scale  subsidy  programs  have  any  experience  with  using  private
contractors  to procure, store,  and supply wholesale quantities of the subsidized commodities,
the concept of separating government  financing from private  service delivery has been used
in various specific  parts of distribution  programs.  For example,  Egypt's ration system  uses
licensed  private  retailers  who  are  authorized  to  sell  both  non-rationed  and  rationed
commodities.  Similarly, the Pakistan government formerly used a network of private shops to
distribute  its  flour  and  sugar  rations.  Other,  similar  programs,  such  as  the  school  meal
program in Chile, have gone further in contracting  in-kind distribution to private agents.
The difference between the cost to the government for a unit of a commodity included in
a  distribution  program  and  the  value  to  the  consumer  may  be  significant.  As  previously
mentioned,  often the government  budget does not account for the full  cost in that it fails to
include  the  full  cost to the  economy of grain procured under quotas.  Similarly,  the costs of
credit as well as administrative  costs may be under-valued  in official accounting.  This often
leads  to  a  substantial  distinction  between  the per  unit  costs  to  the  agency  involved  with
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these may differ from the per unit benefit to the consumer, which, in infra-marginal  transfers,
is based on the difference  between the subsidized price and the local price at which the good
is  available.  In  a highly  regulated  market,  the  local  price  may not  be  related  to  the  real
scarcity  value  of the commodity,  and the  implicit transfer to the consumer  offsets some  of
their economic  loss stemming from these market distortions.'3
V. The Politics of Subsidy Reforms
Who  advocates  food policy reform  and who resists?'4 While few countries  have  introduced
general  food subsidies in recent years,  many  countries have reformed their existing  systems.
The  nature  and timing of such  reforms  depend  on many  factors,  including the  interplay  of
diverse  interests  expressed  by local  groups  and  international  agencies.  For  example,  often
support for subsidy reform  comes  from Ministries  of Agriculture,  which represent  farmers'
interests, as opposed to Ministries of Food (or Supply), which represent consumers'  interests.
However, these two interests are often allies in lobbying for subsidies as this is an option that
allows  the  reduction  of  implicit  taxation  of  farmers  (or  increased  subsidies)  without
increasing consumer prices. Finance ministries, however, are more likely to see these explicit
costs as destabilizing the national budget.
Other  key  groups in promoting  or resisting food policy  reform  are  food processors  and
marketers.  In the USA, food retailers  and processors joined with farm  groups in opposition to
changing  the current  food  stamp  program to an income  transfer.  The retailers and processors
stand to lose  14,000 to 25,000 jobs together  with the loss of 3,000 to 6,000 farm sector jobs if
there were a 20 billion dollar reduction in total food stamp program benefits (Kuhn et al,  1996).
An early, unsuccessful  reform  attempt in Bangladesh was  stymied by millers.  In 1955,
the  then province  of East  Pakistan  attempted  to  eliminate  rural rations  and to lay  off the
employees of the Civil Supply Department  (CSD), only to reverse its decision the following
year.  Interest groups, such as the CSD workers, are often able to coordinate their efforts since
their stake in perpetuating  government distribution is comparatively  large and their numbers
are  sufficiently  small that  each  worker  can  envisage  the  personal  benefits  that may  accrue
from a joint, well-organized  response.  Yet,  the small  numbers  in each  interest  group  often
also  implies that these interest groups have  to seek allies.  In the case of the  1955  attempted
reform,  the  CSD  workers  were  able to  recruit  wider  support  when the  harvest  failed  and
prices began rising.
This contrasts  with successful reforms in Bangladesh in the 1990s and in Pakistan in the
1980s.  In these examples,  no coalitions between  supply department  workers and the general
public were  formed to  oppose  the reforms  because  consumers  were receiving  few benefits
13 Reutlinger  and Katona-Apte  (1983)  made a similar argument regarding food aid. The value to consumers of a
commodity provided in food  aid that is  more expensive locally than on the international  market due to various
protectionist policies may exceed the cost of the good, including transport. Conversely, the benefit to consumers
from goods  that are priced  locally below import parity may be far less than what it costs to provide  them with
the good.
14  Among the few published case studies or reviews of the process of subsidy reform are Bienen,  and Gersovitz
(1986),  Nelson  (1985),  Alderman  (1988),  Tuck  and  Lindert  (1996),  Adamns  (1998),  and  Chowdhury  and
Haggblade (2000).
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stake  (Adams,  1998  and  Alderman,  1988).  Also,  in  Bangladesh,  the  urban  ration  was
curtailed  because a lack of supplies of the subsidized good at the local level. This meant that
there was only a narrow margin between  the  subsidized good and alternative  goods, which
again reduced  the  value  of the program  to consumers  who  were  thus even  less  inclined to
fight to keep it.
Market  reforms  can  pre-empt  consumer  resistance  by  providing  direct  benefits  that
offset  the  fact that  consumers  will no  longer  benefit  from  the lost  subsidies.  Zimbabwe's
experience in removing  subsidies on roller maize meal  in 1993  is one example of this. When
the  Zimbabwean  government  cut  its  subsidies  on  roller  milled  maize,  it  simultaneously
liberalized  private  milling  and  trade.  The  net  result  was  that  the  cost  of meal  for  poor
consumers  was  lowered  since  they  were  able  to  switch  to  cheaper  hammer-milled  meal
(Jayne  and  Jones,  1997).  This  separated  the  millers'  interests  from  those  of the  wider
population and contributed to the public's acceptance of the reforms.
Mismanaged  food price  reforms weaken  governments  and often destroy the careers of
their  advocates.  While violent  responses  occur  in  wake  of only a minority  of food  policy
reforms  and  widespread  consequences  follow  in  even  fewer,  most  governments  are  well
aware of the potential  for this to happen. The riots following a selective raising of commodity
prices  in  Egypt  in  1977  are  particularly  well  known;  more  recently,  in  1997,  food  riots
occurred in the wake of currency devaluation  (and subsequent  increases  in the costs of traded
commodities) in Indonesia and Zimbabwe.
Yet,  because  these  are  rare  relative  to  the  number  of price  changes  and  systematic
reforms  that  have  been  introduced,  policymakers  have  an  interest  in  assessing  what
contributes  to public  acceptance  of reforms.  A  few  general  patterns  emerge  from  country
experiences.
First, the  public  is more  likely  to accept  a policy  change  if they are told the  rationale
behind  it,  perhaps  through  advanced  publicity.  For  example,  they  could  be  told that  the
government  is seeking to make fiscal savings (presented  in concrete terms  such as the share
of oil revenues,  overall  taxes,  or the number  of schools that could be  built) or to minimize
economic  costs such  as corruption and the burden on farmers. Early publicity in this regard
may prevent some interest groups  from hiding their self-interested  aims by arguing  that the
reform  will impose  hardships  on  a wider community.  To various  degrees,  this strategy has
been used in Bangladesh,  Pakistan, and Zimbabwe.
The  government  of Egypt,  which  failed  to  prepare  the  public  for  its  abolition  of
subsidies in 1977, regularly compared  the cost of the subsidy in the  1  980s to the overall size
of revenues  from  the  Suez  canal  in  order  to  impress  its  magnitude  upon  the  population.
Similarly,  in  Tunisia,  which  has  a  history  of violent  protests  against  subsidy  cuts,  the
government preceded the reforms in the 1  990s by a public relations  campaign. The campaign
stressed the cost of the system  and the services-such  as the number of hospital beds-that
could be purchased with the same resources (box 2).
18Box 2: The Process of Subsidy Reform in Tunisia
In  Tunisia,  fiscal  pressures  from  a  food  subsidy bill  that reached  4  percent  of GDP  in  1984  made  the  food
subsidy program  unsustainable.  An  initial attempt  to  reduce the budgetary  costs  of the program was  made  in
1984  and  subsidies  on  several  food  items  were  eliminated,  effectively  doubling  their  prices.  Violent  riots
erupted  in  response to these sudden  reform  efforts,  forcing officials  to  rescind the measures  and delaying  the
adoption of significant reforms until the end of the decade.
Disturbed  by the  violent responses  to  earlier cuts  in the program,  the Tunisian  government  adopted  an
innovative  approach  in  1990  to reduce  the budgetary  costs of these transfers  in a manner  that was  politically
acceptable  and  that  protected  the  purchasing  power  and  nutritional  status  of the  poor.  These  reforms  self-
targeted  the  food subsidies by (a)  shifting  subsidies to items  that were perceived  by consumers as  "inferior"
(though their nutritional  value  was preserved)  and were thus consumed  primarily by lower-income  groups;  and
(b)  liberalizing  the  sale  of unsubsidized  higher-quality  varieties  that appealed  to  the  more  well-to-do,  who
would then consume less of the subsidized  foods. Rather than drastically  reducing subsidies  all of a sudden, the
government  introduced  the  self-targeting  reforms  (and associated  subsidy cuts)  gradually  by raising the prices
of certain  goods in some  months  and others  in other  months.  Also,  subsidies  on the most  sensitive  products
were reduced  during the summer  when the students (who were  pivotal  in the earlier riots) were  not  in school.
The government  also used a media campaign  to  prepare  Tunisians  in  advance  for the  reforms and  introduced
compensating measures to ease political pressure and the impact of  adjustment on the poor.
The  results of these  reforms have been  impressive.  Self-targeting  had halved the cost of the program by
1993  (from  4 to  2 percent  of GDP). It  also  improved the  incidence  of the program -- subsidies  benefited  the
richest groups two times more than the  poorest groups  in  1985  but  by  1993 the poor benefited  1.1  times more
than the rich.  Self-targeting  also protected recipients'  nutritional (caloric)  intake  more than comparable  across-
the-board  subsidy cuts  would have.  Finally,  widely publicized  polls showed  that most  Tunisians  understood,
accepted,  and agreed with the necessity of the reforms.
Source: Tuck and Lindert (1996)
Alternatively,  an  intense  media  campaign  can  be  used  during  the  first  months  of a
program.  In  Jamaica,  generalized  food  subsidies  were  replaced  by  food  stamps  almost
immediately  after  this  change  was  announced  by  the  government.  In  the  following  six
months,  an  extensive  media  campaign  was  run using  radio,  television,  handbills,  a public
address system, and a series of inserts in a major national newspaper to announce and explain
the system and to publicize how the public could sign up for food stamps.
Second, governments  can mute  opposition to subsidy reform from coalitions of the poor
and  ideologically  motivated  groups  by  introducing  credible  policies  to  protect  the  most
vulnerable  groups.  This  does  not necessarily  have  to  be in  terrms  of food  subsidies  as  cash
transfers can have a similar, or greater, impact on poverty. Nor does it have to consist of direct
compensation  to all individuals  for the costs of the reforms.  Indeed, compensation as opposed
to redirecting  funds is ill-advised;  if all groups who lose out as a result of a policy change are
compensated  fully for their loss, not only will there be no fiscal savings but any mistargeting
will be perpetuated.  Public  acceptance  is likely to be enhanced  if the government introduces
safeguards for the poor that are perceived to be equitable  as well as credible.
If  the  safety  net  program  is  in  place  at  the  time  when  the  inefficient  program  is
reformed,  then the government's  credibility  is guaranteed.  Constituents can then  assess the
fairness  of the  benefits  of the  safety  net  as  well  as  the  impact  of the  market  reforms.
Credibility  can  also be  enhanced  if the  program  is  part  of a popular  mandate  or  election
manifesto.  In some countries,  such as Jamaica and  Sri Lanka,  the reform of untargeted price
subsidies  was debated  in  election  campaigns.  In others  countries,  the new  government  has
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party's election platform.
Third,  these  coalitions  of public  support  may  be  needed  to  offset  opposition  from
interest groups who benefit from the subsidies that are due to be abolished. This suggests that
governments need to pay particular attention to institutions and merchants who have a vested
interest  in  the  economic  distortions  that  many  subsidy  programs  create.  This  is  a  very
different  issue than protecting poor consumers  who will see their real income decline  when
food  prices  rise.  Small  interest  groups  tend  to  be  able  to  mobilize  to  protect  their
concentrated  benefits.  Whenever  possible,  governments  should try to change  administrative
structures  to  shift the  economic  rents  that  these  groups  receive  to  the general  population,
even  if there  are  no  obvious  savings  to  the  treasury.  Similarly,  reducing  many  price
distortions  and  indirect  subsidies  will  not  yield  explicit  budgetary  savings  although  the
economic gains maybe appreciable.
Fourth,  changes  in international  prices  will  influence  the  costs  of a subsidy  program.
Often when world prices are low, a food subsidy provides little benefit to the population. This
may be an opportunity to change market structures and, thus, allow the government to consider
other options including targeted programs or income transfers should prices rise.
The Albanian  government  failed to take  advantage of one  such opportunity  in the mid-
1  990s. While it eliminated many price subsidies and instituted a targeted income transfer in its
place as it opened  its economy,  it neglected to remove  administrative  price ceilings  on bread.
For a few years, these ceilings were moot as they were higher than the market price. However,
when world grain prices  shot up  in  1995,  in order to defend the  ceiling  on bread prices,  the
government  had to put restrictions  on flour prices and to provide  subsidized wheat to millers.
This entire  series of interventions  was unplanned  and expensive.  The system of setting prices
was  eventually  scrapped  when prices reverted  to trend.  Had  the government  taken  this step
earlier,  it would have been able to  compensate poor households  for the  sharp price though its
targeted public assistance programs.
There  is  less  of a  consensus  on a  fifth  issue, the  pace  at which  food policy  reforms
should  be  introduced.  Egypt  has  been  able  to  reduce  the overall  costs  of its  subsidies  by
making gradual  changes  in unit costs as well as in the number of products that it subsidizes.
Whether  this can be applied in other contexts,  however, is questionable.  Some policymakers
favor making small price  changes  because these  are too  incremental  to be likely to provoke
organized  protests  and  can  be  accommodated  by  comparatively  minor  adjustments  in
household  budgets.  However,  repeated  price  changes  may  convey the  impression  that the
government has no plan,  or capacity, to hold the line. Thus, the credibility of the government
may  be  called  into  question.  Moreover,  if merchants  anticipate  price  changes,  they  may
withhold  their products  until the changes  are implemented.  Also,  it is difficult to introduce
incremental  changes  in  a targeting  system  or in the method of distribution.  However,  there
are some steps that can be taken to phase in the overall reform package. As mentioned above,
this  includes  ensuring that there is initial  publicity  spelling out the rationale  for the reform.
Similarly,  in many  circumstances,  a new targeted poverty program  can be  introduced,  or at
least piloted, prior to the abolition of the general subsidies.
Finally,  there is a global tendency  to assume  that two-tier price structures  lead to  two-
tier accounting,  in other words, that, over time, ways are found by producers and rent seekers
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government's role as financier from the market's role of providing services have the potential
to be  the most effective  reforms  and, perhaps  for that very reason,  are  often resisted  by an
entrenched bureaucracy.
If,  in  addition,  governments  recognize  that  food  policy  objectives  are  often  achieved
more  effectively  by delivering  income  support  without  any  direct or  indirect  ties  to  food
commodities,  reforms can  be separated  from the consumption of a given  commodity or use
of a given market  channel.  This increased  flexibility often allows for better targeting  as well
as an increased likelihood that the transfers will result in the poorest beneficiaries  being lifted
out of poverty.
21Annex  1. An International Comparison of Leakage from Food Subsidy
Programs
Leakage to Non-
Type of  Program  Country  needy
Untargeted  Food Subsidies  Egypt (early  1980s),  High (60-80%)
Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen
Untargeted Food Subsidies  Brazil  High (8 1%)
Untargeted Food Rations (i.e., ration shops)  India, Pakistan  High (50-60%)
Ration Shops Targeted Geographically  Brazil, India  Low (5-10%)
Self-targeting Food Rations  Bangladesh (sorghum),  Low (10-20%)
Pakistan
Food Stamps - Targeted by Income  Colombia,  Sri Lanka (post-  Low-Moderate  (10-
1979),  United States  30%)
Food Stamps - Targeted by Health Status  Colombia, Indonesia  Low (3-10%)
Honduras  Negligible
Targeted Feeding Programs  Dominican Republic,  Low
Colombia, Pakistan
Supplementation  Schemes - On-site or Take-home,  India, Indonesia  Moderate  (30-60%)
Preschooler plus Mother
Supplementation  Schemes  - On-site, most Vulnerable  India, Tamil Nadu  Low (3-10%)
Group Targeting
Supplementation  Schemes  - Take-home, Nutritionally  India  Low
Vulnerable
Food-for-work Programs  Bangladesh, India,  Low-Moderate (3-
Indonesia  35%)
Targeted Food for Education Program  (free ration for  Bangladesh  Low (7%)
school enrollment of children)
Targeted Vulnerable  Group Development Program  Bangladesh  Low (8-14%)
(free ration for training of destitute women)
Sources: Subbarao et al (1997), Ahmed (2002), Kennedy and Alderman (1987), Mateus (1983).
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This  paper will consider a range of consumer-oriented  subsidy
instruments  including general  subsidies and tax exemptions as
well  as targeted  quotas. Section  II discusses the distribution or
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